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Reforming New Jersey’s Vaccination Exemption Policy
The Conscientious Exemption
Bill
Michael Poreda
poreda@hotmail.com

The Flu Vaccine Protest
When New Jersey became the first
state to require a flu vaccine for children
in 2008, parents protested outside the
State House.1 The new mandate requires
children ages six months to five years to
get an annual flu shot in order to attend a
child-care facility.2 Some protesting parents expressed fear that adding the flu
vaccine to an ever-growing number of
required vaccines might be unhealthy. 3
Many expressed particular fears that vaccines cause autism.4 Louise Habakus, a
spokesperson for New Jersey Coalition
for Vaccination Choice, one of the rally
organizers, stated that it was an issue of
parental autonomy.5 “This is not an antivaccine rally—it‟s a freedom of choice
rally.”6
Current Law

The language of New Jersey school
vaccination laws does not give parents
much choice concerning vaccination.
New Jersey permits only medical and
religious exemptions from vaccination.7
In order to receive a medical exemption, a
physician or registered nurse must write a
statement that the child has a medical
contraindication listed in the guidelines of
the Centers for Disease Control‟s Advisory Committee of Immunization Practices or the American Academy of Pediatrics.8 In order to get a religious exemption, a parent must write a statement that
the child has “bona fide” religious beliefs
that conflict with vaccination.9
New Jersey‟s vaccination policies are
a balance of public health and personal
liberty.10 Mandatory school vaccinations
have been instrumental in eliminating
infectious diseases.11 Because infectious
diseases can be eliminated even with vaccination rates below one-hundred percent,12 the state legislature has determined
that it is reasonable to accommodate the

small number of children whose health or
religious beliefs make mandatory vaccination an unreasonable burden.13
The Conscientious Exemption
The rallying parents came out in support of a New Jersey bill that would provide for a “conscientious exemption,”
defined as “an exemption from mandatory vaccination on the grounds of a sincerely held or moral objection to vaccination.”14 In order to qualify for the proposed “conscientious exemption,” a parent must obtain certain forms from a
public health official, prove that she has
been educated about the dangers of not
vaccinating, and submit her objections to
particular vaccines in writing to a public
health department.15
The New Jersey Department of
Health and Senior Services (DHSS) has
firmly opposed the conscientious exemptions bill.16
DHSS has stated that
(„New Jersey‟s Vaccination Policy,‟ Continued on page 10)

Value-based Insurance Design
One Non-legislative Health
Reform Option

Kate Freed
katherine.freed@student.shu.edu

The Political Problem for Health Reform
President Obama signed into law the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 20101 on March 23 and the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act2
on March 30.3 The passage of these two
contentious bills ushers in the most farreaching legislative health reforms since
1965. In response, fourteen states are
challenging the validity of these laws in
federal court.4 However, one reform that
both parties will likely agree upon is value
-based insurance design (VBID). VBID
has been implemented by employers,

health plans, and pharmacy benefit managers and is specifically permitted by the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.5 VBID does not alter the existing
insurance structure; rather, it introduces
evidence-based medicine to cost-sharing
formulas to create consumer incentives
that improve health for sufferers of
chronic conditions while reducing costs
to both patients and insurers.6 To understand how VBID will achieve these dual
goals, it is important to understand how
the current cost-sharing system frustrates
the need to improve health and contain
costs.
How Insurance Cost Sharing Works
Ninety percent of all private insurance plans use a tiered cost-sharing prescription drug benefit plan.7 Drugs are

generally
classified
as generic,
preferred
brandname, or
n o n preferred
brand-name, with increased cost sharing
for each tier.8 Cost-sharing mechanisms
such as coinsurance or copayments are
intended to reduce overconsumption
created by moral hazard.9
Theoretically, patients responsible
for the full cost of a prescribed service or
medication will choose to purchase only
those for which the benefit exceeds the
total cost.10 In practice, however, patients
(„VBID,‟ Continued on page 11)
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The New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act

The Rigorous Requisites to Compassionate Use in New Jersey
The Highs (and Lows) of
Legalizing Medical Marijuana
Nicole Hamberger
nicole.hamberger@student.shu.edu
On January 18, 2010, New Jersey
became the fourteenth state in the nation
to permit the use of marijuana for medical
purposes.1 The New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (Act) was
enacted after the state legislature concluded that “modern medical research has
discovered a beneficial use for marijuana
in treating or alleviating the pain or other
symptoms associated with certain debilitating conditions.”2 In effect, the Act‟s
purpose is “to protect” medical marijuana
patients, their primary caregivers, and
their physicians from “arrest . . . and
criminal and other penalties.”3 While the
Act is a significant first step in making
medical marijuana accessible to patients, it
is relatively narrow in scope and may
erect significant access barriers against
certain patients who could benefit from
medical marijuana.4
Limited Medical Conditions
Five groups of patient conditions
qualify for treatment under the Act. The
first group that qualifies for access to
medical marijuana consists of those conditions considered to be “[d]ebilitating
medical condition[s]” that are “resistant
to conventional medical therapy.”5 Such
conditions are listed as “seizure disorders
[including epilepsy], intractable skeletal
muscular spasticity, or glaucoma.”6
Under the second group, the patient
must have one of the following types of
conditions: a “positive status for human
immunodeficiency virus [HIV], acquired
immune deficiency syndrome [AIDS], or
cancer.”7 This group must also exhibit
one of the following symptoms: “severe
or chronic pain, nausea or vomiting,
cachexia [a wasting syndrome]8 or [any

other] wasting syndrome result[ing] from
the condition or treatment thereof.”9
The third group of conditions includes “amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, multiple sclerosis, terminal cancer, muscular
dystrophy, or inflammatory bowel disease
including Crohn‟s disease.”10 A patient
who does not have any of these illnesses
may still fall within the fourth or fifth
groups which cover “terminal illness, if
the physician has determined a prognosis
of less than [twelve] months of life”11 or
“any other medical condition or its treatment that is approved by the department
by regulation.”12

“WHILE

THE

ACT

CERTAINLY

SUPPLIES RELIEF TO A LARGE
GROUP

OF

SUFFERERS,

OTHERS ARE LEFT BEHIND.”

While the Act certainly supplies relief
to a large group of sufferers, others are
left behind. Individuals such as those
suffering from cystic fibrosis are not explicitly included in the Act.13 News reports in the wake of the legislation mention stories such as that of cystic fibrosis
sufferer Brian Sercus, who suffers from
loss of appetite and is required to consume 5,000 calories a day because his
“body consumes a lot of calories just to
maintain itself.”14 He believes that he is
one of many who would benefit from the
appetite-inducing effects of THC (a substance in marijuana).15 Others who suffer
from conditions such as anxiety and generalized chronic pain, conditions that
qualify under the California Compassionate Use Act, are similarly outside of the
Act‟s scope.16
Hope does exist, however, for those
who wish for expansion of the Act‟s
scope of permissible conditions. The Act
gives the Commissioner authority to add
new debilitating medical conditions to
those included in the Act.17 These regula-

tions are to be implemented by October
2010.18
No Insurance Coverage Mandate
The Act explains that “[n]othing in
this act shall be construed to require a
government medical assistance program
or private health insurer to reimburse a
person for costs associated with medical
use of marijuana . . . .”19 Medical marijuana will therefore fall outside of the
budgets of many Medicaid and Medicare
patients as both services require compliance with federal laws as a precondition
for government assistance; any marijuana
costs by patients eligible under the Act
will have to be financed from personal
out-of-pocket costs.20 Lack of sufficient
resources may also plague those with private insurance who otherwise rely on
prescription drug plans to help assist with
prescription drug costs.21
The price of medical marijuana is not
provided in the Act, which states only
that the Alternative Treatment Centers
(“Centers”) which dispense the marijuana
may charge “reasonable” prices.22 In an
attempt to control costs, the Act mandates that the first six Centers be nonprofit and that they be evenly dispersed
so that there are two nonprofit Centers
each in northern, central, and southern
New Jersey.23 After these nonprofit Centers are established, however, individuals
on the open market may apply to the
Department of Health and Senior Services to open their own for-profit Centers, conditioned upon passing a criminal
background check.24
Even
with presumably
cheaper
s t a t e regulated
Centers,
the cost of
(„New Jersey‟s Rigorous Requisites,‟ Continued on page 13)
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The New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act

So Close and Yet So Far
The Debate over Legalization of
Medical Marijuana
Stephanie Mazzaro
stephanie.mazzaro@student.shu.edu
Former New Jersey Governor Corzine, on his last day in office, signed the
Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana
Act (“Compassionate Use Act”), making
New Jersey the fourteenth state to legalize
the use of medical marijuana.1 Patients in
New Jersey now find hope to ease their
suffering from nausea, wasting, seizures,
spasms, and pain, where traditional methods prove ineffective or inefficient.2
While this issue continues to spark heated
debate with strong arguments made by
both sides, suffering patients in the remaining thirty-six states continue to wonder whether they too might find relief in
the near future. Opinions vary greatly on
the topic, leaving many to question what
all of the fuss is about.
Patients suffering
from diseases such as
cancer, amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (“Lou
Gehrig‟s Disease”),
and AIDS find multiple benefits from
using marijuana. For
instance, it has been
said to increase appetite in cachexic—or
emaciated—AIDS patients, alleviate nausea and vomiting in cancer patients on
chemotherapy, and suppress muscle
spasms in patients with Crohn‟s Disease
and multiple sclerosis.3 The marijuana
plant itself contains over four hundred
chemicals, but researchers have isolated
its most active ingredient, delta-9tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), which they
have processed into pill form.4 While
physicians may legally prescribe this oral
medication, it provides only one component of the marijuana plant, and other

compounds present in marijuana may be
therapeutically beneficial as well.5

“A

Possible Benefits vs. Negative Consequences

SEARCH EXISTS ON POSSIBLE BENEFITS

Alternative and holistic approaches
to medicine suggest that treatment is
more than science and that therapeutic
value should take into account the entire
experience accompanying a particular
treatment.6 While evidence suggests that
smoking marijuana is more therapeutic
than taking a pill form of THC, much of
this evidence is anecdotal due to a lack of
research on the subject.7 Heavy regulation by the federal government severely
restricts necessary investigation into this
area. For example, at present the University of Mississippi has the only federally
approved marijuana plantation in the
country.8 Furthermore, researchers wishing to investigate medical marijuana use
must apply to multiple government agencies including the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA), Public Health Service panel (PHS), Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and Food and
Drug Administration (FDA).9
As spokesperson for NIDA explained: “As the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, our focus is primarily on the
negative consequences of marijuana use.
We generally do not fund research focused on the potential beneficial medical
effects of marijuana.”10 While this may
be due to a fear that the possible negative
consequences of marijuana on health and
society will expand with the legalization
of marijuana for medicinal purposes, it
seems unlikely that the desire to keep
marijuana‟s use as limited as possible by
making it illegal in all circumstances is
justified.
Like most drugs, marijuana has side
effects and negative consequences. As
discussed in a National Institute of Health
(NIH) workshop on the medical utility of
marijuana, the risks associated with mari-

FAIR COMPARISON CANNOT BE

MADE AS LONG AS SO LITTLE REOF SMOKING MARIJUANA.”

juana, especially when smoked, must be
considered in terms of immediate effects
on the lungs as well as long-term effects
on patients with chronic illness.11 Clinically significant impairment of immune
system function, a potential side effect
under study, may be especially detrimental
to someone with an already serious illness.12
Because there is evidence that smoking marijuana has positive benefits for
patients, however, more research should
be done to determine whether the experience of smoking is, in fact, a contributor
to marijuana‟s therapeutic effect. While
smoking carries with it its own negative
consequences, the possible benefits
should not be written off by such potential problems where the benefits have not
even been properly researched and quantified. A fair comparison cannot be made
as long as so little research exists on possible benefits of smoking marijuana.
Drugs Compared
The definition of “drug” under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA) includes an article used in the
treatment of disease or one intended to
affect the structure or any function of the
body.13 Over-the-counter drugs, such as
common cold medications, post potential
side effects on their warning label.14
These side effects grow in number and
seriousness with prescription medications
that require approval by a physician, nurse
practitioner, or physician‟s assistant.15
Comparison between marijuana and
prescription drugs used under careful
supervision tends to show that the side
effects are relatively similar in terms of
(„So Close Yet So Far,‟ Continued on page 13)
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Accountable Care Organizations
A New New Thing with Some
Old Problems
Thomas L. Greaney*
greanetl@slu.edu
When pressed for evidence that the
proposed health reform legislation will
control costs, proponents invariably cite
the numerous pilot programs and other
innovations in Medicare payment policy
contained in the bill. Among the most
promising of these is the “Shared Savings
Program” found in Section 3022 of H.R.
3590,1 which will test the effectiveness of
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)
in rationalizing the delivery system and
controlling costs. The idea, which carries
the endorsement of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)2
and the influential health service researchers at Dartmouth,3 is not entirely novel.
In many respects the ACO is the latest in
a long line of efforts to develop integrated
delivery systems that bear financial responsibility for treatment decisions. In
addition, a number of experiments involving bundled payments to ACOs and
to other innovative organizations (as in
Medicare‟s Physician Group Practice
demonstration) have been underway for
some time.
Supporters contend that as a voluntary pilot program, ACOs can develop in
forms suitable to local market conditions
and gain acceptance in the physician communities that have proved resistant to
managed care structures in the past. In
the long run, the aspiration is that private
insurers will follow suit and proliferating
ACOs will lead the way to delivery system
reform.
The ACO concept envisions a legal
entity comprised of and controlled by
providers that would assume financial
*Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Director,
Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University
School of Law

responsibility for the cost and care of a
defined population of Medicare beneficiaries while being subject to a variety of
quality standards and information reporting requirements.4 The new law leaves
much detail to the discretion of the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS),5 presumably
informed by experience and learning as
the program progresses. For example,
the legislation delegates development of
standards for quality, use of evidencebased medicine, and “patientcenteredness” to HHS.6 In addition,
ACOs may take diverse forms, such as
local networks of physicians, hospitals,
and their affiliated physicians, fully integrated health systems, or “virtual” networks of providers.7 Notably, as proposed in the House Reform bill, the program would have tested alternative incentive payment methodologies
(performance targets and capitation payment). The law ultimately adopted relies
initially on shared savings; that is, the
ACO will receive and distribute a rebate
representing a portion of the savings it

“THE NEW

LAW LEAVES MUCH DE-

TAIL TO THE DISCRETION OF THE

S ECRET ARY
PRESUMABLY

OF

[HHS],

INFORMED

BY

EXPERIENCE AND LEARNING AS THE
PROGRAM PROGRESSES. ”

has achieved through more efficient practices.8
A critical problem, largely ignored
during the legislative debate, is the likely
tension between the legislation‟s overall
reliance on competition and the organizational structures and norms that may be
established by ACOs. At first blush, the
ACO model seems well designed to foster
competition among providers.
Not
unlike health maintenance organizations
and other integrated delivery forms,

ACOs assume responsibility for coordinating care and thus have strong incentives to provide cost-effective care and to
do so in a manner that is transparent and
hospitable to comparative shoppers.
But at the same time, the path of
ACO development could prove profoundly anti-competitive. The concern
lies with the possible exacerbation of already-weak competitive conditions prevailing in provider markets. Owing to
indifferent enforcement of antitrust laws
by the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice over the last ten
years and questionable judicial precedents,
hospital mergers proceeded at an unprecedented pace.9 Over ninety-three
percent of the nation‟s population lived in
concentrated hospital markets, and the
American consumer bore the brunt of the
predictable outcome: hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient
prices by at least five percent and by forty
percent or more when merging hospitals
were closely located.10 Less well noted is
the concentration in specialty physician
markets that went unchallenged during
recent years, lessening the ability of managed care organizations to negotiate lower
prices for their services.11 Further, even
where antitrust prosecutors were active,
challenging over seventy-five physician
cartels involved in price fixing or efforts
to thwart managed care, the relief gained
was little more than a wrist slap, an unfortunate dereliction that certainly did little
to foster competitive norms in the provider community.12 Overall, it is fair to
characterize the prevailing attitude among
providers over the past thirty years as one
of seeking first to avoid competition
though concentrative mergers and other
affiliations and, in some cases, by engaging in illegal collusion.
Encouraging competitive development of ACOs in this market environment may prove challenging. First, it is
(„ACOs,‟ Continued on page 7)
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‘ACOs,’ Continued
unclear the extent to which regulators will
foster the formation of multiple, competitive ACOs around the country. It is certainly feasible that HHS might determine
(as the reform legislation appears to allow) that it is more important to encourage voluntary participation in ACOs than
to promote competitive ACOs.
An
“open door” policy for ACOs (allowing
them to include all comers in their markets) would likely lead to concentrated
formal and informal affiliations. (As
noted above, the FTC has dealt with dozens of proposed physician networks and
“super PHOs” of considerable size that
proposed to bargain on behalf of physicians and hospitals; efforts to create overinclusive ACOs to lessen rivalry are
unlikely to diminish.) It also bears remembering that provider groups have
lobbied incessantly for many years for
exemptions from antitrust laws, arguing at
various times that a “level playing field”
justified collective bargaining by physicians, or that efficiency would be improved by such immunity.13
Even if the Secretary adopts a policy
of encouraging competition among
ACOs, there may be competitive obsta-

cles to effectively implementing that goal.
First, as discussed above, the highly concentrated state of many provider markets
may make it difficult for HHS to secure
participants willing to “share” their savings proportionately with other providers.
Moreover, if the Medicare ACOs are seen
as likely to be adopted by private insurers,
dominant providers will not be reticent to
exercise their market clout. As Robert
Leibenluft, a former FTC official has
pointed out, in allocating among themselves the shared savings of their ACO,
physicians and hospitals may adversely
affect competition in the private market:
The meetings at which the
reallocation of those funds occurs may . . . be the types of
meetings in which price collusion can take place. Deciding
how ACO revenues should be
divided among the ACO participants typically would not
raise antitrust concerns, but
serious issues would arise if
such discussions spill over into
how independent providers will
contract outside the ACO context.

The new arrangements also
may make it easier for physicians to exclude potential competitors from entry into the
local market.14
As I have argued elsewhere,15 the
structure of our health care delivery system gives us the worst of both worlds:
fragmentation and concentration. Hospital and specialty provider markets are
highly concentrated; most primary care
physicians remain in “silos” of solo or
small practice groups; and there is scant
“vertical integration” among providers of
different services. Not only does this
phenomenon impede effective bargaining
to reduce costs and prevent overutilization of services, but it also has adverse
effects on the quality of health services
patients receive because it inhibits coordination of care. While ACOs represent
the most promising antidote on the horizon to this problem, their success will
depend on vigilant monitoring of competitive conditions by HHS and the antitrust enforcement authorities. ☼

Electronic Cigarettes
A Tobacco Product or a DrugDevice Combination?
Matthew McKennan
matthew.mckennan@student.shu.edu
On January 14, 2010, the United
States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted a preliminary injunction against the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), stopping the agency from
seizing shipments of electronic cigarettes.1
On February 1, 2010, the FDA appealed
the District Court‟s decision, seeking to

defend its jurisdiction over e-cigarette
regulation.2 The District Court‟s decision
and the subsequent appeal have sparked
controversy among smokers, e-cigarette
users, and public health advocates regarding the FDA‟s ability to regulate tobacco
products and the safety of e-cigarettes.
What Is an Electronic Cigarette?
An electronic cigarette (“e-cigarette”)
is a device with three basic parts: a cartridge containing chemical ingredients, a
heating element, and electronics with a
battery.3 The device is made to resemble,

in form and in function, an actual cigarette.4 The cartridge, or mouthpiece, typically holds propylene glycol and liquid
nicotine.5 The heating element, powered
by the electronics and the battery, heats
the liquid nicotine and vaporizes the mixture.6 The electronics detect when a
smoker inhales, then trigger the heating
element which in turn releases the vaporized mixture, mimicking real cigarettes.7
According to Smoking Everywhere, Inc.,
the e-cigarette distributor and importer
challenging the FDA‟s ability to seize or
(„Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 16)
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“He Who Has Health Has Hope, and He Who Has Hope Has
Everything”
An Analysis of the Health Implications of Child Marriage in
West Africa
Dawn Amber Pepin
dawn.pepin@student.shu.edu
Takia: age 12, married
at 9 in Niger: . . . “One
day my father told me that I
was to be married. I was
never asked if I loved him or
not. But it was my duty to
respect the decision of my
parents.” Representatives from the local youth
organization say Takia‟s husband is 45 or 50.
He promised—and waited—until Takia was
11 before consummating the marriage. She
became pregnant soon after, and gave birth at 11,
at home, to a daughter, Layla.1
☼☼☼

Child marriage remains a common
practice among many groups in countries
around the world, with West Africa experiencing notoriously high rates.2 At a
young age, girls are socially isolated, denied education, subjected to grave health
risks, and often the victims of domestic
violence.3 This practice arguably violates
many provisions of human rights treaties,
including provisions demanding health,
equality, access to education, and in some
cases those guaranteeing freedom from
torture and slavery.4 Analyzing the health
implications of child marriage using international human rights treaties, with a focus on West Africa, demonstrates that
states have an obligation to protect these
vulnerable children.
Background on Child Marriage
Child marriage is still prevalent in
many developing countries; in fact, there
are millions of child brides every year.5
The 2003 Demographic and Health Sur-

vey program reported that fifty-one million girls ages fifteen to nineteen were
married worldwide.6 The United Nations
Population Fund believes that over onehundred million girls will be married in
the next decade.7 These child marriages
are often coupled with extremely negative
health implications.

and morbidity.20 In Mali, the maternal
mortality and morbidity rates (MMR) for
girls ages fifteen to nineteen are 178
deaths per 1000 live births.21 This rate is
significantly reduced to 32 deaths per
1000 live births for those who give birth
between the ages of twenty and thirtyfour years.22

When a girl is married as a child she
is often forced to have unprotected sex
with an older man who has had multiple
sexual partners.8 Marriage to an older
man therefore puts the girl at greater risk
for sexually transmitted diseases.9 Young
girls with older husbands often feel pressured to demonstrate fertility and are
unable or too embarrassed to talk to their
husbands about protected sex.10 Unfortunately, the rates of contraceptive use in
West Africa are still less than ten percent.
For this reason, a young girl who is married is more likely to contract a sexually
transmitted disease than her unmarried
counterpart.12 Additionally, married girls
are two to eight times more likely to contract HIV than boys of the same age.13
One Malian study looked at cervical cancer, which is closely linked with the human papillomavirus (HPV), to indentify
the major risk factors in developing the
disease.14 The study found that the major
risk factors for cervical cancer in the region were child marriage, a high number
of births, and polygamous husbands.15

Complications during delivery are
generally said to be a result of pregnancies
being “too soon, too close, too many, or
too late.”23 In fact, compared to women
who give birth after twenty years of age,
those who are fifteen to nineteen years
old are twice as likely to die, and those
who are ten to fourteen years old are five
to seven times more likely to die from
childbirth.24 These early deaths are typically the result of post-partum hemorrhaging, eclampsia, HIV infection, or

Girls are not only at a greater risk for
sexually transmitted diseases but also for
pregnancy at a young age; early pregnancies can result in catastrophic impacts on
the girl‟s health.16 Rates of early child
bearing are very high in West Africa.17
Mali serves as a striking example. One in
ten girls in Mali gives birth before the age
of fifteen.18 By ages fifteen to nineteen
sixty-three percent of girls have already
given birth.19 Early child bearing results
in significantly higher maternal mortality

“THESE

CHILD

MARRIAGES

ARE OFTEN COUPLED WITH
EXTREMELY NEGATIVE HEALTH
IMPLICATIONS. ”

obstructed birth.25 When a girl with an
underdeveloped pelvis gives birth it often
leads to obstructed labor.26 In many
cases, the young mother will need a cesarean section because without one the unborn child will die and the mother will be
lucky to live.27 Even if the mother lives,
she is likely to develop an obstetric fistula,
an embarrassing condition that results in
uncontrollable passing of fecal matter and
urine.28 As a result, the condition often
leads to ostracism and depression. 29
Child marriage often contributes to
mental health problems as well. Depression and lack of identity are common
among girls married at a young age.30 A
woman who marries as a child misses the
(„Child Marriage,‟ Continued on page 12)
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FDA Warnings on the Rise, Not the Usual Suspect
An Evaluation of FDA
Regulatory Letter Policy
Rachel Jones
rachel.jones@student.shu.edu
Recently, the FDA has noticeably
increased the number of regulatory letters
sent to alleged violators of its rules and
regulations. Most notably, the Division
of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Communications (DDMAC) issued thirteen regulatory letters in the first quarter
of 2010, compared to a total of forty-one
in 2009 and twenty-one in 2008.1 In addition, the FDA has shown increased scope
of monitoring by issuing a regulatory letter to a well-renowned dermatologist who
specializes in cosmetic medicine. 2
Dubbed the Skin Guru, Dr. Leslie
Baumann may be the first clinical investigator3 to receive an untitled letter from

the FDA based solely on alleged violations for promotion of an unapproved drug under
21
C.F.R.
§ 312.7(a).4
Background
The
FDA
is
charged
with
monitoring, investigating, and legally
pursuing violations of the federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) and
other FDA regulations.5 The FDA‟s policy is to issue regulatory letters as a
mechanism to enforce voluntary compliance with the law.6 The FDA is not required, however, to notify an individual
or company of a violation before seeking
enforcement action.7

There are two types of regulatory
letters that the FDA may issue. A
“warning letter” may be issued if a violation has met the threshold of “regulatory
significance,” and an “untitled letter” may
be issued when the threshold has not
been met.8 Under the first type, a violation that appears to have “regulatory significance” must also be significant
enough that it may lead the FDA to pursue an enforcement action if not
promptly and adequately corrected.9 The
“untitled letter” is less severe and is generally issued when a violation has occurred but is not significant enough to
warrant immediate enforcement action by
the FDA.
Rapid Increase in Issued Regulatory
Letters
(„FDA Warnings on the Rise‟, Continued on page 15)

End-of-Life Decisions in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit
Who Gets to Decide?
Constantina Koulosousas
ckoulosousas@gmail.com
Over the past few years the medical,
legal, and ethical considerations in the
case of marginally viable newborns has
become a major area of concern.1 The
number of premature infants has risen in
recent years, partially due to the increased
use of assisted reproductive technology, 2
and the chance of survival for these infants has risen due to the improvement of
medical treatments that allow infants,
once thought hopeless, to be saved.3
Decision making for never-legallycompetent periviable infants, who cannot
make autonomous medical decisions on
their own, presents a complicated situation. Therefore, a constant struggle exists
between physicians and families in decid-

ing the proper course of treatment and
who should make these medical decisions.
Medical Background
The decision-making process is further complicated because severely premature infants face a wide range of potential
mental and physical disabilities. In a long
-term outcome study of infants born in
the United Kingdom and Ireland, 30 to
50 percent of children born at earlier than
twenty-five weeks gestation with a birth
weight of less than 750 grams (1.65
pounds) had moderate to severe disabilities, including blindness, deafness, mental
retardation, and cerebral palsy.4 Studies
have also shown that many of these infants have more than one disability and
face an increased incidence of learning
disabilities as school-aged children.5
Parents and physicians of these marginally viable newborns frequently make

instantaneous treatment decisions upon
their infant‟s birth. In most cases, parents
in high-risk pregnancies will have prepared for these decisions during prenatal
care.6 Because of the generally unpredictable state of these infants prior to physical examination, however, these decisions
have to be adjusted time and time again.7
Physicians are often hesitant to provide
individualized medical judgments or recommendations and instead turn to statistics to offer the parents guidance. Consequently, similarly situated newborns are
frequently treated differently because
(„Neonatal End-of-Life Decisions,‟ Continued on page 16)

PAGE 10

HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK

‘New Jersey’s Vaccination Policy,’ Continued
“[b]road exemptions to mandatory vaccination weaken the entire compliance and
enforcement structure,” and it contends
that “the highest number of children possible must receive vaccines to protect
them and others.”17 Twenty states currently offer “philosophical exemptions,”
similar to the “conscientious exemption,”
which permit parents to opt out of immunization programs.18 In most of those
states, overall exemption rates are
higher,19 and studies have shown that
more exemptions increase the risk of
outbreaks.20 Nevertheless, the National
Vaccine Advisory Committee has stated
that philosophical exemptions pose no
significant risk to public health based on
the small number of people who claim
them.21
DHSS‟s statement is nevertheless
dissatisfying for two reasons.
First,
DHSS overlooks its duty to balance public health with personal autonomy. When
state legislatures created modern mandatory school vaccination laws in the 1960s
and 1970s, there were only a few required
vaccines, and vaccination was uncontroversial.22 Those who created the laws
thought of them as reminders rather than
tools of coercion.23
With an everincreasing number of vaccines, however,
and popular (though scientifically unfounded) suspicion that too many vac-

cines cause health problems, notably autism, the New Jersey flu mandate strikes
many parents as unduly coercive.24 Coercing parents into vaccination might
reduce the prevalence of the flu, but it
comes at a high cost to liberty that adversely affects society.25 Heavy-handed
government mandates can, in the end,
undermine the public consensus that has
helped sustain vaccination programs for
the last fifty years.26
Second, DHSS‟s statement also fails
to mention that, in spite of the strict language of the New Jersey law, which only
grants non-medical vaccine exemptions to
parents with sincere religious beliefs, it
also informally instructs school administrators not to question the sincerity of any
parent who writes a letter claiming to
hold a religious belief that opposes vaccination.27 Thus, DHSS‟s approach towards increasingly suspicious parents is to
coerce them into taking the risks of a
medical procedure with which they are
uneasy—or to encourage those who
know about the religious exemption loophole to quietly and permanently opt out
of all vaccination.
Proposal
Rather than oppose the conscientious bill for broadening vaccination exemptions, DHSS should propose that

New Jersey entirely reform its vaccination
exemption poli c y .
Eliminating the
vacuous
religious
exemption and
replacing
it with a conscientious exemption would
give all parents who oppose any part of
New Jersey‟s vaccination program, no
matter what the reason, the chance to
have their wishes respected, provided that
they engage in dialogue about the risks
and benefits of vaccination with a public
health representative.
Such a policy
would result in greater respect for parental autonomy, while maintaining the high
level of vaccination that is essential to the
success of a vaccination program.
An Exemption’s Design Matters More
Than Its Name
A 1999 study found that philosophical exemptions in and of themselves do
not reduce vaccination levels.28 Rather,
the ease of obtaining an exemption correlates to the number of children opting out
of vaccination.29 In many states, claiming
a philosophical exemption is simply a
(„New Jersey‟s Vaccination Policy,‟ Continued on page 11)

‘New Jersey’s Rigorous Requisites,’ Continued
medical marijuana may still be quite steep;
in some states that have passed similar
acts, an ounce of marijuana costs between
$100 and $150 at state-regulated dispensaries.25 The Act allows patients to purchase as much as two ounces of marijuana per month26—using the numbers
above, costs could amount to up to $300
of out-of-pocket costs for qualifying patients. The Act additionally prohibits
home growing marijuana for personal use,

thus omitting that option as a cheaper
alternative.27
Employment Barriers
Marijuana may still be illegal under
federal law, but the federal laws prohibiting possession and use of medical marijuana are not being enforced in states
such as New Jersey that have Compassionate Use Acts. In October 2009, the
Department of Justice announced that
while medical marijuana is still rendered

illegal by the federal Controlled Substances Act,28 the U.S. Department of
Justice will only sanction marijuana users
violating federal and state law.29 Therefore, as long as medical marijuana is used
in compliance with the Act, users need
not worry about federal involvement. In
effect, New Jersey state law will be controlling on the matter of legal medical
marijuana.
(„New Jersey‟s Rigorous Requisites,‟ Continued on page 13)
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‘New Jersey’s Vaccination Policy,’ Continued
matter of checking off a box on a form, a
task that is far easier and cheaper than
bringing a child to a doctor for a series of
shots.30 The study concluded that states
that placed “high procedural burdens”
upon parents, such as requiring the filing
of paperwork, written letters, parent education, and annual renewal had lower non
-medical exemption rates.31
New Jersey should look to the state
statutes of Arkansas for guidance in reforming its vaccination laws. In 2002,
two federal courts in Arkansas ruled that
the religious exemption in that state was
unconstitutional.32 Left without any type
of non-medical exemption, Arkansas reformed its laws to provide for philosophical exemptions with very high procedural
burdens.33 Specifically, parents must fulfill an education requirement and fill out
paper work on an annual basis in order to
exempt their children from vaccination.34

The Arkansas policy has many aspects that make it far superior to New
Jersey‟s current exemption policy. First,
the policy makes it more difficult for all
parents to get an exemption than it is to
simply vaccinate their children.35 Second,
it forces concerned parents, who may
have become scared of vaccines due to
sensationalism or anecdotes that link vaccines to autism, to engage in dialogue
with the public health community.36 The
recommendation of a trusted doctor
could convince otherwise skittish parents
to comply with vaccination requirements,
if not all at once, then at least eventually.37
Third, because the exemption is annual, it
does not allow a parent to permanently
opt out of vaccination because of a temporary concern.38

sting of coercion becomes greater and
greater. The New Jersey conscientious
exemption could help promote the good
of parental autonomy and is unlikely to
seriously undermine public health. The
bill could, however, better secure public
health with an amendment that requires
annual renewal of exemptions, as the Arkansas law does. The annual renewal
requirement would add a significant level
of inconvenience to the exemptionseeking process, which would deter permanent exemptions based upon both
convenience and transient parental fears.
A New Jersey exemption policy that models itself on Arkansas‟s policy can create a
better balance between public health and
parental autonomy. ☼

Conclusion
With the addition of every vaccine to
New Jersey‟s immunization policy, the

‘VBID,’ Continued
often lack the necessary medical knowledge to make appropriate choices about

“VBID

IMPLEMENTS

COST

SHARING IN A WAY THAT REWARDS THE CONSUMPTION OF
APPROPRIATE MEDICAL CARE.”

the value of compliance with prescribed
care. Faced with limited means to cover
the higher costs of copayments, patients
may make decisions that negatively affect
their health and increase costs.11
Evidence from multiple clinical studies indicates that increased cost sharing
succeeds in reducing consumption of
pharmaceuticals; however, consumers
often forego necessary preventive prescription care. In a retrospective U.S.
study examining pharmacy claims data

from thirty employers and fifty-two
health plans, the doubling of copayments
reduced overall spending by one-third
and significantly reduced usage across the
eight most widely prescribed therapeutic
classes.12 Of particular concern is the fact
that chronically ill patients receiving routine care reduced their drug use by 8 to 23
percent when copayments were doubled.13 A survey of published articles on
the effects of pharmaceutical cost sharing
clearly demonstrated that pharmaceutical
use decreased with increased cost sharing.14 Chronically ill patients with congestive heart failure, lipid disorders, diabetes,
and schizophrenia used inpatient and
emergency medical services more with
higher cost-sharing plans, reflecting decreased health.15 Conversely, reduction of
copayments for five chronic medication
classes in a disease management program
reduced medication nonadherence by 7 to

14 percent in the four classes with statistically significant effects.16 Evidence that
the current cost-sharing system inhibits
important preventive care of patients with
chronic conditions highlights the need for
insurance reform.
Value-Based Insurance Design
VBID implements cost sharing in a
way that rewards the consumption of
appropriate medical care.17 Because patients lack the information necessary to
make value-based decisions, reduced copayments for targeted interventions reduce underuse and increase value.18
There are two approaches to VBID.
First, copayment reductions can be targeted to clinically valuable services.19
Second, certain clinical diagnoses can be
targeted and copayments reduced for
corresponding high-value services.20
(„VBID,‟ Continued on page 12)
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‘VBID,’ Continued
Because the value of an intervention varies between patients, the second approach
would result in more efficient resource
allocation. However, it would also be
more costly to implement because eligibility data is patient specific and must be
transferred from payers to the point of
service.21
Although these programs have received attention, many payers have concerns that reduced copayments coupled
with higher compliance will increase
costs.22 However, the costs of reduced
cost sharing and program implementation
are offset by the savings from health improvement.23 “The net financial benefit
will be greater if the underlying risk of an
adverse outcome is high, if the cost of
that adverse outcome is high, if consumers are responsive to lower copayments,
and if the service is very effective at preventing the adverse outcome.”24 For
certain chronic illnesses and medical interventions, experimental programs and
cost analysis have demonstrated that payers actually save money by reducing copayments.
For example, Pitney Bowes, an employer of 35,000 people, implemented a
VBID in which all diabetes drugs and
devices were shifted to tier 1 copayment
status, cutting average employee prescription costs in half.25 Suboptimal insulin
adherence decreased by two-thirds and

use of fixed-combination oral hypoglycemic more than doubled.26 Pharmacy
costs decreased by 7 percent for those
with diabetes due to the reduction in
complications requiring more expensive
drugs, and total emergency room visits
decreased by 26 percent.27 Furthermore,
the average annual increase in Pitney
Bowes employee health costs grew at two
-thirds the rate of benchmark companies.28 Overall, Pitney Bowes both increased overall employee health and reduced cost.
Analytical modeling further supports
these experiential observations. Modeling
of health insurance costs for postmyocardial infarct patients over sixty-five
years of age indicated that full coverage of
secondary prevention medications would
increase compliance from 50 to 76 pecent, reduce deaths by 1.1 percent, nonfatal myocardial infarctions by 13.1 percent,
nonfatal strokes by 1.2 percent, and reduce readmissions for congestive heart
failure by 6.6 percent.29 Comparing increased pharmaceutical costs and decreased event-related costs, insurers
would save $5974 per patient, saving both
lives and money.30 Furthermore, this
analysis indicated that insurers would
benefit within the first year, eliminating
the concern over lost investment that
would result from patient churn.31

Similarly, the elimination of copayments for angiotensin-converting enzyme
(ACE) inhibitors for Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes is expected to increase
utilization by at least 7.2 percent, prevent
adverse medical events, and save $1606
per beneficiary.32 Using claims data from
eighty-eight health plans over five years, it
was determined that patient compliance
with cholesterol-lowering therapy fell by 6
to 10 percent while hospitalizations and
emergency department visits increased
when copayments were doubled.33 Further analysis showed that elimination of
copayments for medium to high-risk patients and increased copayments for low
risk patients would save $1 billion, not
including savings from reduced emergency department visits.34
Conclusion
The clinical evidence demonstrates
that differential cost sharing according to
value will ultimately save money and improve health for specific chronic conditions. The incidence of adverse events
and cost to these patients both decreased.
In comparison to the potential savings,
the cost to implement specifically targeted
VBID programs is minimal. Since it is
unlikely that far-reaching reforms will
redesign health care delivery, private and
public insurers have nothing to lose and
much to gain by implementing VBID
programs. ☼

‘Child Marriage,’ Continued
important adolescent years.31 As a result,
she is isolated from peers.32 Unfamiliar
situations, both inside and outside the
home, create an intensely isolated life.33
Girls often bear children quickly in an
effort “to secure their identity, status, and
respect as an adult.”34 A firsthand account from a pastor from The Gambia
reveals the impact of the early marriage
on girls. He stated that due to high level

of exploitation condoned by society, the
confidence level of women in The Gambia is extremely low.35 He explained that
because of their lack of self-esteem
women do not perform to the best of
their abilities and do not expect much, if
any, reward for all the work they do perform.36

Another common result of child
marriage is domestic violence. Girls often
have little control over sexual relations.37
They fear repercussions, such as “physical
abuse, loss of economic support, or accusations of infidelity.”38 Because they are
economically dependent, young brides are
unable to negotiate for condoms and are
not in a position to resist violence.39 In
(„Child Marriage,‟ Continued on page 17)
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‘New Jersey’s Rigorous Requisites,’ Continued
Consequently, New Jersey must decide the impact of the Act in practice.
Since the Act is not limited to end-of-life
treatment, individuals successfully managing chronic conditions within the guidelines of the Act may wish to return to
work, continue their positions at their
current places of employment, or enter
the workforce. Still, challenges exist for
such individuals due to the manner in
which marijuana is commonly taken (i.e.,
by smoking and inhalation) as well as its
otherwise illegal status. The Act states
that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of marijuana
in any workplace.”30 Workplaces that
prohibit employees from smoking traditional tobacco products on the premises
need not make an exception to accommodate marijuana smokers.
Furthermore, challenges under state
discrimination law for reasonable accom-

modations are likely to fail if the reasoning of a recent California Supreme Court
case is adopted in New Jersey on the matter. In Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., the court dismissed plaintiff‟s
argument that not accommodating his
medical marijuana use at his workplace
violated California‟s Fair Housing and
Employment Act.31 The court held that
there is “no reason to conclude the voters
intended to speak so broadly, and in a
context so far removed from the criminal
law, as to require employers to accommodate marijuana use.”32 Since the Act
expressly states that no accommodation is
necessary, there is a stronger argument
that voters did not intend to accommodate marijuana use in the workplace.
But even if individuals who are prescribed legal marijuana leave the workplace to use marijuana or use it before
coming to work, their troubles are not
over. Employee drug testing is permitted

“OVER

TIME,

OBSERVE

NEW JERSEY

THE

BENEFITS

WILL
AND

DEAL WITH ANY POTENTIAL COMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE

ACT.”
in and regulated by the state of New Jersey. The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the bounds of employers regarding employee drug use and employee drug
testing in Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point
Oil.33 In Hennessey, the Court proclaimed
that the New Jersey State Constitution
represents New Jersey public policy regarding drug testing in the workplace.34
Accordingly, the Hennessey Court followed
In re Martin, which used a “balancing test”
for New Jersey constitutional issues: “The
legitimate public interest [at issue] must
be considered in balance with the com(„New Jersey‟s Rigorous Requisites,‟ Continued on page 14)

‘So Close Yet So Far,’ Continued
severity. Patients with cancer, for example, may have surgery related to their illnesses. If they are intubated (i.e., on a
ventilator), they will most likely receive a
sedative for the duration of days, weeks,
even months. A common sedative, fentanyl, which is also used for pain after
surgery, is an opioid in the same category
as heroin.16 It works by binding to opiate
receptors in the brain, causing a state of
euphoria and relaxation.17 It can also lead
to respiratory depression, confusion, sedation, tolerance, addiction, and even
more serious effects.18 Typically, fentanyl
may be prescribed in combination with
other sedatives and painkillers such as
morphine.19 This is merely one type of
drug used to treat patients‟ symptoms
resulting from disease and consequent
treatment.
Compare this to marijuana. THC in
marijuana acts on cannabinoid receptors

in the brain, which influence pleasure,
memory, and perception.20 Marijuana,
like fentanyl, has addictive potential if
used for an extended duration, can elevate
heart rate, and may have adverse effects
on the lungs, among other possible side
effects.21 Clearly the drug is not without
risks, but if used under the prescription
and supervision of a prescriber, it seems
that the drug‟s side effects are rather similar to the side effects of other drugs typically used in treatment of serious illness.
When prescribing medication regiments, practitioners must weigh the possible side effects of a drug against the
potential benefits a patient will gain from
it. Perhaps under controlled circumstances and under a doctor‟s supervision,
a prescription for marijuana may not be
much different than one for other potentially harmful drugs. The ultimate deci-

sion about administering any drug should
be for suffering patients and their physicians to make after weighing the possible
risks against the benefits. This balance
varies with regard to individual patients.
For example, risks associated with longterm side effects of smoking marijuana,
such as lung damage later in life, may not
matter to a terminal patient with months
to survive who is seeking immediate relief.
Regulation Issues
Marijuana remains an illegal Schedule
I drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act.22 Despite state laws legalizing medical use, the U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld Congress‟s power to prohibit
marijuana use even where a state has legalized it for medical purposes.23 This
past October, however, Attorney General
(„So Close Yet So Far,‟ Continued on page 14)

PAGE 14

HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK

‘New Jersey’s Rigorous Requisites,’ Continued
peting right of privacy on the part of the
affected individuals.”35 The Hennessey
court concluded that the balancing test
weighed in favor of employers‟ freedom
to drug test in “safety-sensitive jobs” due
to “the urgent need to ensure public
safety.”36 The court also said that in occupations where workers “function independently” and the “lack of supervision
renders observation to detect impairment
impractical” drug tests are permissible.37
Consequently, the ability to drug test employees in the state of New Jersey is fairly
broad.
The real issue is what employers will
now do with a positive drug test result in
light of the Act‟s implementation. According to the Employers Association of

New Jersey (EANJ) the legalization of
marijuana has “caused employers to reexamine their „zero tolerance‟ policies with
regard to drug use by employees.”38 The
EANJ also recognized, however, that
“under most state laws, employers are
free to discipline or terminate employees
for positive drug test results, regardless of
whether they are medical users of marijuana.”39 In Ross, the California Supreme
Court further stated that “an employer
may require pre-employment drug tests
and take illegal drug use into consideration in making employment decisions.”40
Ross may be persuasive authority on this
question in New Jersey as well. While
employers may be less likely to take adverse employment actions under the Act,

there is nothing that can legally stop
them.
Conclusion
The Act is a step in the right direction, giving hope to so many New Jersey
citizens in pain and discomfort. While
the restrictions that the Act imposes on
access may seem unduly strict, a substance that is still illegal under federal law
and abused by many for recreational purposes arguably warrants such treatment.
Over time, New Jersey will observe the
benefits and deal with any potential complications arising from the Act. Only
then will we truly be able to see if the
tight qualifications under the Act should
be loosened. ☼

‘So Close Yet So Far,’ Continued
Eric Holder shifted the focus away from
prosecuting medical marijuana use in
states where it was legalized.24 The Attorney General instead directed federal
prosecutors to concentrate on high-level
drug traffickers, money launderers, and
other people who use state law as a cover
in these fourteen states.25
As a result of the Attorney General‟s
shift in focus, the burden of regulation
and enforcement now falls upon local
governments, and many states are now
struggling to determine the best methods
of regulation without breaking their budgets.26 In states like New Hampshire,
which is considering its own compassionate use act, concerns over major budget
cuts may leave the state unable to administer another regulatory system.27 Different types of enforcement problems may
also arise for states that have already legalized medical marijuana. In Los Angeles, where the number of medical marijuana dispensaries rapidly expanded since
its legalization, Mayor Villaraigosa signed
an ordinance in February to cap the number of marijuana dispensaries at seventy,

while also creating buffer zones around
schools and places of worship.28 The
effectiveness of such regulatory measures,
however, remains unclear.
The potential effect of medical marijuana‟s legalization poses additional societal concerns, as marijuana is the most
commonly abused illicit drug in the
United States.29 Where medical use is
tightly regulated , however, legalization of
marijuana for medical purposes does not
mean that illegal abuse for non-medical
use will necessary expand. Senator Scutari, the New Jersey statute‟s co-sponsor,
wanted to avoid laxity pitfalls of other
states‟ laws, such as California‟s inclusion
of stress and anxiety as qualifying conditions for prescription, which he feels led
to abuses.30 Limiting its reach to those
suffering from cancer, glaucoma, HIV,
AIDS, and other such physically debilitating illnesses, in addition to posing numerous other regulations regarding marijuana
prescribers, insurance coverage of treatment, and accommodations for those
smoking marijuana for medical purposes,
New Jersey‟s Compassionate Use Act is

expected to be the nation‟s most restrictive.31
Conclusion
The debate regarding medical use of
marijuana continues, and for good reason.
Concerns over negative health-related
effects, regulatory problems, possible
societal implications, and the fact that it
still remains an illegal drug in the federal
domain are paramount issues. These
issues must be weighed against the possible medical benefits for patients unable to
find effective relief elsewhere, as well as
the belief that marijuana, like other drugs,
has the potential for serious side effects
but can be safely administered under a
physician‟s supervision. Both sides of the
balance show a lack of convincing research and the need for more information
on potential dangers and benefits. In the
meantime, do we force suffering patients
to accept inadequate relief from debilitating symptoms, or do we turn to illegal
means of obtaining marijuana in the majority of states? ☼
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‘FDA Warnings on the Rise,’ Continued
Although the FDA has been less
active in past years,10 there seems to be a
surge in warning letters under the Obama
administration.11 In 2006, the United
States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) issued a report criticizing the time
the FDA takes to issue regulatory letters.12 The length of time to issue a regulatory letter between 1997 and 2001 took
an average of two weeks; however, during
2002 to 2005, that had risen to an average
of four months.13 In addition, the number of regulatory letters also dropped
from 142 in 1997 to twenty-one in 2006.14
The GAO reported that the slowdown in
issuance was largely due to a 2001 decision by the Department of Health and
Human Services to have all such letters
undergo legal review by the FDA‟s Office
of Chief Counsel.15
In response to this drastic slowdown
in the FDA review process, on August 6,
2009, the FDA released a press statement
from the new commissioner, Margaret A.
Hamburg, stating that she would implement new enforcement measures to expedite the warning letter process.16 Incorporating the advice of the GAO, Commissioner Hamburg stated that “the FDA

“THE FDA

HAS A TREMENDOUS

TASK OF SAFEGUARDING THE PUBLIC AGAINST MISLEADING INFORMATION REGARDING UNAPPROVED
DRUGS, ESPECIALLY IN A DIRECT-TO

-CONSUMER MARKETING ENVIRONMENT.”
will streamline the warning letter process
by limiting review of warning letters by
the Office of Chief Counsel to those that
present significant legal issues.”17 In fact,
in 2009, the FDA issued 112 regulatory
letters to pharmaceutical companies compared with forty-three letters in 2008.18 It
appears the streamlining process has al-

lowed the FDA to increase the number of
warning letters issued.

magazine, in the September 2007 issue of
Elle magazine, and on NBC‟s “Today
Show” segment on January 8, 2009:
Reloxin, the new Botox, will likely
come out later this year. Early
data shows it may last longer and
kick in faster than Botox. It will
be nice to have competition on
the market—the Botox people
(Allergan) raised their price another 8 percent this year!
—Allure article

Commissioner Hamburg told a
group of industry representatives, attorneys, consumers, and others attending a
speech sponsored by the Food and Drug
Law Institute in Washington, D.C. that
“the FDA must be vigilant, the FDA
must be strategic, the FDA must be
quick, and the FDA must be visible,” in
order “to prevent harm to the American
people.”19 As discussed previously, the
FDA has become more visible and vigilant through increasing the amount of
regulatory letters issued. Another benefit
of the new policy initiatives has been improvement of the FDA‟s monitoring capabilities. The regulatory letter issued to
Dr. Leslie Baumann is an example of
increased monitoring that has captured
violations that may have been overlooked
in prior years.
Dr. Leslie Baumann’s Untitled Letter
On January 11, 2010, the FDA issued
an unprecedented20 untitled letter to Dr.
Leslie Baumann alleging promotion of the
cosmetic drug Dysport21 (an injectable
neurotoxin which relaxes facial lines to
help eliminate wrinkles, similar to
Botox22) prior to its approval on April 30,
2009.23 Dr. Baumann is a high profile
physician who works in the cosmetic
medicine industry.24 The untitled letter
cited several communications made by
Dr. Baumann as alleged promotional
statements.25 The FDA letter alleged that
Dr. Baumann made the following comments in the April 2007 issue of Allure

I can‟t wait to use Reloxin, know
in Europe as Dysport. The Botox
alternative will be available in the
U.S. next year. Effects last a
month longer than Botox and,
hopefully, it will cost less.
—Elle article
It‟s time that we have something
that lasts a little bit longer, and
I‟m hoping that the minute the
FDA approves this, I‟ll be able to
use it in my practice.
—Today Show26
In addition, the FDA alleged that
these statements clearly suggest, prior to
its approval, that Dysport was safe and
effective and that it was in fact superior to
the approved product Botox.27 In issuing
its untitled letter, the FDA applied regulation 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(a), which states:
A sponsor or investigator, or any
person acting on behalf of a sponsor or
investigator, shall not represent in a promotional context that an investigational
new drug is safe or effective for the purposes for which it is under investigation
or otherwise promote the drug.28
In response to the FDA‟s investigation, Dr. Baumann attempted to argue
that her promotional comments were
based on knowledge regarding Dysport
derived from information obtained during
foreign experiences as an academic physi(„FDA Warnings on the Rise,‟ Continued on page 19)

PAGE 16

HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK

‘Electronic Cigarettes,’ Continued
ban the products, the e-cigarette “looks
like a real cigarette, feels like a real cigarette and tastes like a real cigarette, yet it
isn‟t a real cigarette.”8
E-cigarettes are generally marketed as
a healthy, cost-effective alternative to
traditional smoking.9 E-cigarette advocates and smokers claim that e-cigarettes
are a safer alternative to smoking and that
a ban would detrimentally impact the
smoking community, as smokers continue
to smoke tar-filled, traditional cigarettes.10
Additional claims in support of ecigarettes tend to highlight the ills of tobacco and traditional cigarettes, for example:
Cigarette butts make up 38% of
litter worldwide.

More than 400,000 people in
the U.S. die each year from
tobacco-related disease.
4,000 chemical compounds are
found in tobacco smoke,
whereas only one or two, nicotine and propylene glycol, are
found in e-cigarettes.
One in four forest fires are
caused by tobacco cigarettes.11
Public health advocates generally
acknowledge that e-cigarettes may be
safer than traditional cigarettes, yet continue to argue that e-cigarettes also have
negative effects that call for regulation.
Some negative effects include:
The presence of and addiction
to nicotine and propylene glycol.

Traditional cigarette use when e
-cigarettes are not available.
Marketing that suggests ecigarettes are safe.
Flavors that attract young
smokers.12
Due to little independent research,
much about the potentially harmful components of the e-cigarette and its byproducts remains unknown.13 However, research consistently demonstrates that
nicotine is highly addictive, regardless of
whether it is delivered in vaporized form
through e-cigarettes or by way of more
traditional mechanisms.14
The FDA Seizes E-cigarette Shipments,
Asserting Authority over Medical Devices
(„Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 19)

‘Neonatal End-of-Life Decisions,’ Continued
parents and physicians vary in their assessment of the probabilities involved in
an individual prognosis.8
In the face of this uncertainty, parents often confront the grim choice of
either refusing medical treatment and
allowing the infant to die or pursuing an
aggressive course of treatment with the
likelihood that the child will either not
survive after significant suffering or will
survive with severe abnormalities.9 To
further complicate the situation, although
parents and physician may agree on one
course of treatment during antenatal
counseling,10 the physician may recommend a different course of treatment
upon the birth and physical examination
of the infant.11 Thus, making medical
treatment decisions is extremely difficult
and uncertain for marginally viable newborns whose fragile state make every second critical.
Legal Background

These decisions are further complicated by the legal requirements placed on
hospitals and physicians. In particular,
the legal, ethical, and moral dilemmas
involved render the applicable standard of
care in the case of severely premature
infants difficult to ascertain. “Standard of
care” is defined in medical terms as a
“diagnostic and treatment process that a
clinician should follow for a certain type
of patient, illness or clinical circumstance.”12 In legal terms, “standard of
care” means “the degree of care that a
reasonable person should exercise,”13
which applied in a medical context suggests the “treatment that experts agree is
appropriate, accepted, and widely used
[or] how similarly qualified practitioners
would manage a patient‟s care under the
same or similar circumstances.”14 Generally, the standard of care requires resuscitation for newborns of twenty-five weeks
and greater, while resuscitation for newborns of less than twenty-two weeks ges-

tational age is not considered appropriate
or ethical because the risk of survival is
very low.15
Medical and legal ethics anticipate
that physicians will make decisions that
are in the best interests of the infant.16
Where the best interests of the infant are
not evident, however, neither the medical
nor legal positions as to resuscitation and
life-sustaining treatment are clear.17 Infants born between twenty-two and
twenty-five weeks are considered at the
limit of viability;18 thus, any course of
treatment is uncertain and prognosis is
always speculative.19 Many experts argue
that providing treatment to these infants
is not medically or ethically appropriate
and serves only to prolong the suffering
of both the patient and the patient‟s family.20 With these considerations in mind,
who makes these important life or death
decisions and how?
(‟Neo-natal End-of-Life Decisions,‟ Continued on page 22)
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‘Child Marriage,’ Continued
this environment of servitude, they are
often forced into “degrading and humiliating” activities.40
Legal Arguments
Legal customs in West Africa are a
combination of religion, cultural customs,
and imported colonial common and civil
law.41 Women‟s autonomy in West Africa
is shaped by the common practices of
legal institutions, derived from “[n]atural
law principles of male superiority, common law and Christian religious principles
of female inferiority, and Islamic tenets of
female domesticity and incapacity.”42
International Treaties
Today, however, every country in
West Africa has ratified a human rights
treaty that addresses health.43 Human
Rights treaties that address health consist
of both United Nations Conventions and
regional agreements. These treaties include United Nations efforts such as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC),44 the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),45 and the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).46 These
UN Conventions have been widely ratified by West African Countries.47
In
fact, every West African country has ratified both the CRC and the ICESCR with
virtually no substantive reservations affecting the provisions on health.48 All
West African countries have also ratified
CEDAW; however, the reservations made
by a few states are extensive.49
Additionally, most West African
countries have also ratified regional human rights agreements.50 These regional
agreements largely reflect the same rights
as the UN conventions. Relevant agreements include the African Charter on
Human and Peoples‟ Rights,51 the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child,52 and the Protocol to the African

Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa.53
Major UN conventions also have
corresponding monitoring bodies at the
UN. These committees monitor situations worldwide and also provide specific
interpretations of convention provisions.54 The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued General Comment 14 on the right to
the highest attainable standard of health,
initially addressed in the ICESCR. General Comment 14 requires that states both
protect and fulfill the right to health.55
According to the Committee, governments are required to take action “such as
by providing relevant services, to enable
individuals and communities to enjoy the
right to health in practice.”56 This requires that states take positive measures,
with special consideration for vulnerable
groups, to “create, maintain, and restore”
the health of the population.57
There are many aspects of forced
child marriage that affect the health status
of the young girl. First, girls should have
the right to access healthcare.58 Article 24
of CRC establishes the child‟s right to
health and to access to health services.59
In child marriages, however, a girl‟s access
to medical care is often limited to what
her husband or her in-laws decide is appropriate.60 Therefore, even if the government provides access to health services, it simultaneously curtails access by
allowing the repressive practice of child
marriage to persist.
Both ICESCR and the African Charter require state parties to recognize a
person‟s right “to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health.”61 Article 14 of The
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child also establishes that
“every child shall have the right to enjoy
the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health.”62 In addition,
The Protocol to the African Charter on

Human and People‟s Rights on the Rights
of Women in Africa demands that states
“ensure that the right to health of
women, including sexual and reproductive health[,] is respected and promoted.”63
These girls are restricted from
achieving the best attainable state of spiritual, mental, and physical health. As discussed above, these issues include increased risk for HIV and other STDs,
birth complications, domestic violence,
mental health issues, and depression.
Under the CESCR‟s General Comment
14, states have a positive duty to create,
maintain, and restore the health of the
population. Significant health risks accompany child marriage; governments
have a duty to protect this vulnerable
population.
Supporting Case Law
In the following cases, The African
Commission on Human and People‟s
Rights (“the Commission”) analyzes Article 16 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples‟ Rights. Article 16 addresses
“the right to enjoy the best attainable
state of physical and mental health.64
Similar wording is also used in Article 12
of ICESCR.65
The Commission evaluated this right
in the case Free Legal Assistance Group and
Others v. Zaire. In this case, the Commission held that the government of Zaire
violated Article 16 when it failed to provide detainees with medicines, safe drinking water, and electricity.66 While access
to care or medicine is a clear violation of
the right to health under Article 16, the
court went further: it stated that lack of
safe drinking water and electricity was
also part of the violation of the right to
health in this case.67 These acts are not in
and of themselves physical or mental
harms, but they lead to a subsequent
health violation.
(„Child Marriage,‟ Continued on page 18)

PAGE 18

HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK

‘Child Marriage,’ Continued
Free Legal Assistance Group demonstrates that the state is responsible not
only for direct physical and mental harms
but also for actions that subsequently
result in a health violation. It is possible
to analyze forced child marriage in a similar way. It is not marrying a young girl
that immediately results in health violations; rather, it is the widespread and
harmful physical and mental health outcomes that may qualify the practice as a
violation of Article 16.
The Commission also addressed
Article 16 in Social and Economic Rights
Action Center & the Center for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria.68 In that case, the
government allowed oil drilling with essentially no regulations.69 Oil spills led to
the contamination of the environment
and subsequent health problems of the
Ogoni people.70 When applying Articles
16 (right to health) and Articles 24 (right
to a safe environment) the Commission
stated that the government of Nigeria
must desist from “carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or
legal measures violating the integrity of
the individual.”71 It also held that the
state must order or at least allow for testing before, and monitoring and evaluation
of communities after, exposure to hazardous materials.72
The Rights Action Center case establishes that under international human
rights conventions, states have a duty to
protect their citizens from human rights
violations, which include health violations. Regulating and monitoring the oil
program could have protected the citizens
of Nigeria. As applied to child marriage,
this would require regulation and monitoring of the age of marriage to protect
young girls from forced marriage and the
resulting health risks.
In Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia,
the Commission considered a case that
involved the treatment of mental health
patients.73 The psychiatric ward at issue

was overcrowded and lacked the
standardized commitment proceedings
provided by domestic legislation. 74
Article 16 was violated when the state
failed to develop appropriate therapeutic
objectives and failed to match resources
with programs of treatment.75 In its
decision, the Commission noted that
“[e]njoyment of the human right to
health . . . is crucial to the realisation of all
the other fundamental human rights and
freedoms.”76 It also recognized that
special treatment that should be afforded
to mental health patients.77
Purohit and Moore requires the state to
provide even greater protection for
vulnerable populations under the
provisions protecting health. In that case
the court noted that mental health
patients should receive special treatment.
This principal is applicable to child
marriages because, like the mental health
patients, these children are a category of
people that do not have the ability to
protect themselves.
Application to Child Marriage
These cases set forth a standard
under which child marriage may be
determined to be a violation of the
provision on the right to health in Article
16. States have an affirmative duty to
take targeted steps toward ensuring the
right to health within their available
resources, and this duty extends to those
acts that will only result in a future health
violation. Moreover, states have an even
greater responsibility when the population
to be protected is a vulnerable population.
The health implications of child
marriages—both physical and mental—
are striking.
Young girls in child
marriages are subject to an increased risk
for sexually transmitted diseases, birth
complications, depression, domestic
violence, and even death. Increasing the
marriage age reduces these risks
dramatically.78 When West African states

permit child marriage, either by neglecting
to put laws in place prohibiting them or
by neglecting to monitor the impact of
laws already in place, they are permitting a
practice that results in serious health
issues. Furthermore, these children do
not have the resources or knowledge
required to prevent the harm to their
health.
These children constitute a
vulnerable population that requires
special protection by the state.
States have an affirmative duty to
take steps to prevent practices that result
in health violations.
Economic
limitations are not a viable excuse for
failing to protect health.79 In this case,
positive steps might include increasing
marriage age in the domestic legal system,
mandating evaluations of the law in
practice, and educating the population on
the risks of the practice.
Perspectives
West Africa has some of the highest
rates of early marriage in the world. In
most cases families are simply doing what
they believe is best for their daughters.
Unfortunately, child marriages often
result in reduced access to education and
skills training, life-threatening health
complications, and physical and mental
abuse. In order to end this practice more
coordination is needed. International
agencies must set a minimum age for
marriage and enforce the standards put in
place. It is also very important for local
communities to be involved. Educated
communities can make well-informed
decisions about their local practices when
they have knowledge of both the risks
and their rights.80 Finally, states that have
signed and ratified international human
rights treaties must monitor the situation
in their countries and take positive steps
to protect these children. ☼
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‘Electronic Cigarettes,’ Continued
In September 2008, the FDA detained multiple e-cigarette shipments at
the Los Angeles International Airport
imported by Smoking Everywhere.15
Citing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the FDA then issued
a letter to Smoking Everywhere which
stated that the e-cigarettes “appear to be
intended to affect the structure or function of the body, and to prevent, mitigate,
or treat the withdrawal symptoms of

nicotine addiction.”16 The FDCA defines
a drug-device combination as an article
“intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body”17 or “intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease.”18
For example, drug-device combinations
include transdermal patches and similar
products that supply a drug through the
skin to treat various medical conditions.19
According to the FDA, the e-cigarettes
were an unapproved drug-device combination and were to be shipped back or
destroyed within ninety days.20
After the 2008 incident, Smoking
Everywhere filed suit against the FDA,
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, and Secretary Kathleen Sebelius,
seeking to enjoin the FDA from denying
the entry of e-cigarettes into the United
States.21 Sottera, Inc., which does business under the name NJOY, is also an ecigarette importer and distributor.22

When the FDA detained an inbound
shipment of NJOY e-cigarettes in April
2009, NJOY successfully intervened
alongside Smoking Everywhere.23 Accordingly, the FDA‟s decision to seize ecigarette imports was not an isolated incident, but rather a policy that could potentially impact all e-cigarette importers and
distributors seeking to enter the U.S. market.24
Tobacco Products or Drug-Device
Combination?
The District Court analyzed the
FDA‟s decision to seize e-cigarettes
within the complex interplay between the
FDA‟s authority to regulate drugs/
devices and its more limited authority to
regulate tobacco products. Interestingly,
the complexity arises from a closely
watched Supreme Court decision, FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., and the
Congressional response, which resulted in
( „Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 20)
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cian, as well as from anecdotal observations of colleagues, and not from her role
as a clinical investigator in the clinical
trials of Dysport.29 The FDA recognized
that regardless of Dr. Baumann‟s source
of knowledge, “representations by an
investigator in a promotional context that
an investigational new drug is safe or effective for the purposes for which it is
under investigation, or representations
that otherwise promote the drug, are a
violation of FDA‟s regulations.”30 Since
it is rare for a physician to be issued a
warning letter,31 the FDA may have used
Dr. Baumann‟s case to show the cosmetic
drug industry that the FDA is scrutinizing
all aspects of promotional violations.
The above regulation also states that
the intent of the provision is not to

“restrict the full exchange of scientific
information concerning the drug, including dissemination of scientific findings in
scientific or lay media.”32 However, an
inadvertent consequence of the FDA‟s
regulation of Dr. Baumann is an unintended restriction on the full exchange of
scientific information. The conventional
standard in the field of cosmetic medicine
has been for a physician to promote upcoming drugs or endorse the latest unapproved cosmetic uses for existing drugs
and devices.33 In fact, journalists look to
these physicians who are leaders in their
area of expertise to keep them abreast of
current products in the pipeline.34
Some industry experts believe this
type of regulatory letter will limit what
information an investigator will discuss

regarding an unapproved drug, as well as
curb journalist interest in reporting information from investigators on unapproved
drugs.35 At least one investigator has
stated that he will continue to talk to journalists about products in the pipeline but
he might limit his future comments to
scientific facts and published studies.36 In
fact, Dr. Baumann herself stated:
This means, of course, that those
doctors such as myself who have
the most experience with the
newest procedures and products
will be able to say the least in public about them until FDA approval is issued. To get the educated viewpoint, you will just have
to see me as a patient or wait until
(„FDA Warnings on the Rise,‟ Continued on page 23)
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the recently enacted Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA).
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Supreme Court held that
tobacco products, such as traditional cigarettes, are not subject to FDA regulation
as a drug or device.25 Congress, however,
subsequently passed the TCA, extending
the FDA‟s jurisdiction to reach tobacco
products.26 The TCA defines “tobacco
product” as “any product made or derived from tobacco that is intended for
human consumption.”27 The TCA further asserts that the FDA cannot regulate
tobacco products as drugs, devices, or
drug-device combinations.28
Thus, the
TCA provides the exclusive basis for
FDA regulation of tobacco products. As
a result, tobacco products, unlike drugs
and devices, are not subject to the
FDCA‟s pre-market drug approval process and cannot be banned for failing to
meet these requirements.29 Rather, the
TCA requires the FDA to regulate tobacco products under a different statutory
framework than the drug and device industry.30 Pursuant to the TCA, the FDA
can enact only a narrow range of regulations and penalties regarding certain practices of the tobacco industry, such as marketing restrictions, nicotine level restrictions, manufacturer oversight, and civil
penalties.31
After initiating their suit against the
FDA, Smoking Everywhere and NJOY
argued that because e-cigarettes are similar to traditional cigarettes, the FDA cannot regulate them as a drug or device
under the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.32 Further, Smoking Everywhere noted that, because e-cigarettes are
considered “tobacco products” under the
TCA, e-cigarettes are exempt from regulation as a drug-device combination and are
therefore not subject to the drug-device
approval process.33 While the TCA allows the FDA to regulate tobacco prod-

ucts, it does not allow the FDA to ban
the products or to limit acceptable nicotine levels to zero.34
In response, the FDA argued that
under FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., only traditional cigarettes were outside the FDA‟s jurisdiction and that because e-cigarettes are not traditional tobacco products, the FDA has the power
to regulate them as a drug or device.35
Next, the FDA argued that e-cigarettes
are drug-device combinations under the
definitions provided by the FDCA.36
Under this line of reasoning, e-cigarettes
would be subject to the rigorous requirements of drug-device combination regulation because the TCA excludes drugdevice combinations from the definition
of tobacco product.37 Therefore, the
FDA argued, because e-cigarettes are
marketed in a manner that would affect a
structure or function of the body and are
intended to mitigate nicotine use, they fall
squarely within the definition of a drug or
device and are not “tobacco products.”38
Was the FDA’s Interpretation Reasonable?
The District Court gave deference to
the FDA‟s interpretation under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.39 Chevron requires that the
court first determine “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and then to give effect to
Congress‟s “unambiguously expressed
intent.”40 If Congress did not speak unambiguously, however, the court is obligated to defer to the agency‟s interpretation, but only if the court finds that the
agency‟s construction was permissible or
reasonable.41
Under Chevron, the District Court
found that it was undoubtedly ambiguous
as to whether Congress intended to classify e-cigarettes as a drug-device combination or tobacco product.42 The court
then held that the FDA‟s interpretation

and subsequent classification of ecigarettes as drug-device combinations
rather than tobacco products, however,
was entirely unreasonable.43
First, the court rejected the FDA‟s
contention that e-cigarettes are intended
to affect a structure or function of the
body and are therefore drug-device combinations.44 The court noted that this
interpretation was simply “bootstrapping
run amuck.”45 If e-cigarettes were classified as drug-device combinations under
this theory, then traditional cigarettes
would also be classified as drug-device
combinations.46 And if traditional cigarettes were classified as drug-device combinations, then the FDA would presumably have a duty to ban them, because cigarettes are infamously dangerous products
that would not pass clinical testing.47
Therefore, because the TCA did not ban
cigarettes, it was unreasonable to classify
the similarly situated e-cigarettes as a drug
-device combination “merely because they
deliver nicotine.”48
The court then rejected the FDA‟s
attempt to interpret “tobacco product” to
include only traditional tobacco products.49
The court noted that Congress specifically
enumerated certain types of tobacco
products such as cigarettes and pipe tobacco in some portions of the TCA, yet
then chose the broadly phrased term
“tobacco product” in the portion at issue.50 This clearly demonstrated congressional intent to confer jurisdiction over
tobacco products in a broad manner, not
just over traditional products such as real
cigarettes as used in other portions of the
TCA.51
Finally, the court rejected the FDA‟s
claim that e-cigarettes are drug-device
combinations because they are made to
prevent or alleviate nicotine withdrawal
symptoms.52 The court rejected this interpretation because the evidence pre(„Electronic Cigarettes,‟ Continued on page 21)
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sented at trial showed only that the ecigarettes were marketed as a healthier
alternative to smoking and not as a device
to reduce nicotine use.53 Rather than
being marketed to prevent or mitigate
nicotine addiction, the e-cigarettes actually encouraged its use and could not reasonably be interpreted as alleviating or
preventing nicotine withdrawal.54
Unlike other products that seek to
alleviate nicotine withdrawal, such as
nicotine lollipops, waters, gums, or lip
balms that may fall under the drug-device
combination definition, the e-cigarettes
did the exact opposite.55 The court observed, “The clear import of Smoking
Everywhere‟s advertising is that it wants
consumers to use its electronic cigarettes
for the same recreational purposes and
with the same frequency as traditional
cigarettes.”56
In summary, the court held that the
FDA cannot ban the import of ecigarettes on the basis that they are unapproved drug-device combinations under
the FDCA.57 The FDA unreasonably and
impermissibly constructed the terms drug
-device combination and tobacco product.58 In its closing remarks, the court
further chastised the FDA, stating:
This case appears to be yet another example of FDA‟s aggressive efforts to regulate recreational tobacco products as drugs
or devices under the FDCA.
Ironically, notwithstanding that
Congress has now taken the
unprecedented step of granting
FDA jurisdiction over those
products, FDA remains undeterred. Unfortunately, its tenacious drive to maximize its regulatory power has resulted in its
advocacy of an interpretation of
the relevant law that I find, at
first blush, to be unreasonable
and unacceptable.59

While the District Court emphatically
rejected the FDA‟s ability to regulate ecigarettes as a drug-device combination,
the FDA retains its authority to regulate e
-cigarettes under the TCA. Moreover,
public health advocates and cigarette
smokers continue to insist that legislatures take notice of the debate regarding e
-cigarette safety.

“NOTABLY,

THE

FDA

CANNOT RE-

QUIRE THAT IMPORTERS OR DIS-

FDA APPROVAL
BEFORE SELLING E-CIGARETTES IN
THE UNITED STATES.”
TRIBUTORS SEEK

Perspectives
The FDA currently regulates items
such as inhalers60 and nicotine gum.61
Both of these items must receive FDA
approval before they can be marketed as
therapeutic devices.62 If they do not receive approval, the FDA has authority to
seize or destroy any unapproved devices
shipped into the United States.63 Because
e-cigarettes are not drug-device combinations but rather tobacco products according to the district court‟s interpretation in
Smoking Everywhere, they do not need FDA
approval and cannot be seized or banned
under the FDCA. Therefore, the FDA
must regulate e-cigarettes just as it does
traditional cigarettes under the TCA.
While many will agree that ecigarettes may provide a safer or less
harmful alternative to traditional cigarettes, they still present many of the same
detrimental health effects as their predecessor.64 As the FDA attempts to regulate the products, e-cigarette advocates
will continue to support the e-cigarette‟s
ability to decrease tobacco use. Public
health advocates may agree and oppose
an outright ban, arguing that the ecigarette may actually provide a safer alternative. However, they may also sup-

port banning the product because ecigarettes promote nicotine addiction and
have not been approved by the FDA.
Currently, many countries, including
Australia,65 Canada,66 and Singapore67
have banned the sale and use of ecigarettes.68 Others have restricted advertising in a manner similar to that of traditional cigarettes In California, Governor
Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill in 2009 that
would have banned the sale of ecigarettes, stating that “[i]f adults want to
purchase and consume these products
with an understanding of the associated
health risks, they should be able to do so
unless and until federal law changes the
legal status of tobacco products.”69
Notably, the FDA cannot require
that importers or distributors seek FDA
approval before selling e-cigarettes in the
United States. Rather, current law states
that e-cigarette importers and distributors
are free to sell a wide variety of untested,
addictive drug-delivery products, simply
because Congress has specifically exempted “tobacco products” from the
FDA approval process. The rise in ecigarette sales and the Smoking Everywhere
decision highlight the somewhat conflicted objectives Congress has assigned
the FDA: to protect consumers in the
drug and device marketplace while at the
same time gingerly policing tobacco products. ☼
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‘Neonatal End-of-Life Decisions,’ Continued
Generally, medical decisions are
made by the patient or the patient‟s
guardian after full informed consent.21
Informed consent represents the principle
of disclosure by a treating physician
which allows the patient “faced with a
choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at
all, to intelligently exercise his judgment.”22 A physician is required to fully
inform his patients and obtain their informed consent to any service or procedure before it is performed.23 But an
exception to the informed consent requirement arises in the case of emergency
situations;24 a physician has no duty and
avoids legal liability when it is impracticable to obtain consent from the patient or
the patient‟s surrogate before treating an
emergency.25
The emergency exception arises
when parents attempt to hold physicians
and hospitals liable through wrongful life
suits26 for providing life-sustaining measures upon birth to severely premature
infants without their explicit consent.27
In most situations, however, courts have
refused to apply the doctrine of informed
consent, holding that the birth of a severely premature infant in distress and in
need of immediate medical attention is an
emergency situation specifically exempt
from the informed consent requirements.28 Further, these courts noted that
a viable alternative to providing lifesustaining measures did not exist pursuant to the United States Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act29 (CAPTA)
and therefore no parental decision needed
to be made.30 CAPTA seeks to prevent
the “withholding of medically indicated
treatment from a disabled infant with a
life-threatening condition,” thereby making resuscitation the only option for the
treating physicians.31 Consequently, at the
time of birth, physicians may treat a newborn without parental consent, and, at
least initially, the only choice available to

the physicians is to resuscitate the infant
and attempt to save the infant‟s life.32

“GIVEN

THE INHERENT UNPRE-

DICTABILITY OF A SEVERELY PREMATURE INFANT’S CHANCE OF
SURVIVAL,

THE

CONSTANT

IN-

VOLVEMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN IN
INFORMING AND COUNSELING THE
PARENTS IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.”

Federal Laws and Their Implications
Congress has enacted a variety of
laws that could theoretically inform treatment decision making in the case of severely premature infants. Since the decision to treat these infants focuses on
quality of life and potential future disability, anti-discrimination laws naturally become a part of the concern where physician and hospital decisions are involved.
The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) prohibits discrimination by
“public accommodations,”33 including
hospitals, on the basis of an individual‟s
handicap or disability.34 This law, along
with the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),35 is
triggered when a hospital delivers an infant and withholds medical treatment
from the infant solely because of its disability or potential for disability.36 EMTALA requires that hospitals screen and
stabilize each individual who presents
with an emergency medical condition or
in active labor.37 While EMTALA does
not apply to inpatients on the face of the
statute, interpretive guidelines set forth by
the Department of Health and Human
Services note that a labor and delivery
department could meet the definition of a
dedicated emergency department, thus
excluding infants as inpatients.38

The Federal government has also
implemented laws for the prevention of
child abuse. CAPTA ensures against parental abuse or neglect,39 providing states
with legal recourse, like injunctions, when
parents withhold or withdraw medically
necessary life-sustaining treatment from
infants.40 The Born Alive Infants Protection Act (BAIPA) accords any infant
“born alive”41 the same rights and protections accorded to all citizens under the
Constitution.42 BAIPA had modified the
application of EMTALA in the case of
newborn infants. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued guidance obligating the hospital to admit the
patient or comply with the stabilization
and transfer requirement of EMTALA
where an infant was born alive “anywhere
on the hospital‟s campus” and was observed by a prudent layperson to be suffering from an emergency medical condition.43 The regulations imply that a newborn infant is not already an inpatient for
purposes of EMTALA and that the inpatient exception would apply only if the
infant were “born alive and then admitted
to the hospital.”44 Although not officially
binding, the Guidance is consistent with
the language of both statutes.45
Who Should Decide and How?
All of these rules necessarily play a
role in the decisions of treatment or nontreatment of severely premature infants
and to some extent affect the decisionmaking ability of the parents. While physicians and hospitals are obligated to follow the desires and decisions of the parents regarding treatment of infants, they
are also bound by the legal regulations.
Further, because hospitals are required to
comply with EMTALA regardless of the
acceptable standard of care or the parents‟ wishes, physicians often find themselves in situations where they are forced
to provide infants with treatment that
(„Neonatal End-of-Life Decisions,‟ Continued on page 23)
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they consider medically inappropriate. 46
Physicians face a unique challenge in providing care to severely premature infants
as they must balance the desires of the
parents against their legal requirements
and ethical obligations. Consequently,
physicians could be faced with a “loselose” situation if the law requires the physician to always provide medical care but
permits the parents to bring wrongful life
cases for failing to follow their desires to
withhold treatment.
It follows that constant open communication between the physician and the
parents is absolutely essential. It is the
treating physician‟s obligation to make
sure that the parents are aware of all the
possible options, the prognosis, and the
risks and benefits involved with any particular course of treatment. Physicians
should make sure that parents understand the inherent uncertainty of the
situation and should explain that statistics
are merely numbers and do not mean
much when it comes down to the individual care of this particular infant. The

physician should also use his medical
training and experience to offer the parents advice and suggest a particular course
of treatment. The advice should be honest and practical in light of the infant‟s
best interests, the individual families‟
needs and desires, and the physician‟s
ethical and legal obligations.
Conclusion
Given the inherent unpredictability
of a severely premature infant‟s chance of
survival, the constant involvement of the
physician in informing and counseling the
parents is absolutely necessary. For this
reason, antenatal counseling, although
extremely important, should not end all
discussions. Such pre-birth decisions
have the potential to subject the physician
and hospital to liability from both sides.
If no resuscitative measures are taken
pursuant to the parents‟ antenatal decision, liability may exist under the ADA,
EMTALA, CAPTA, and BAIPA. Conversely, if the infant is born in a better
state than previously predicted and if lifesaving medical treatment is given to the

infant
based
on the
physician‟s
professional
evaluation and
judgment, the hospital and physician may
face lack of informed consent and wrongful birth lawsuits by the parents.
Decisions to withhold life-sustaining
medical treatment should be made by the
parents after antenatal counseling, clinical
evaluation, and initial response to treatment upon birth. This approach will,
most importantly, ensure that the treatment is in the infant‟s best interests, and
ensure that the parents‟ ultimate desires
are not overlooked because of federal
laws and the emergency exception to informed consent. Furthermore, it will
protect hospitals and physicians from
liability and ethical violations. ☼

‘FDA Warnings on the Rise,’ Continued
the F.D.A.‟s approval allows the
doctors with first-hand scientific
experience to address the medical
advance.37
As industry experts grapple with the
impact of this FDA regulatory letter, the
consensus may be that an individual investigator will scale back their dissemination of scientific information regarding
unapproved drugs.
The FDA has a tremendous task of
safeguarding the public against misleading
information regarding unapproved drugs,
especially in a direct-to-consumer marketing environment. Through the direction
of a new commissioner, the FDA has
chosen to improve enforcement measures

by issuing more regulatory letters and by increasing monitoring of
promotional materials
for unapproved drugs
and off-label uses. The
ability of the FDA to
capture different aspects of promotional
violations will hopefully clarify to practitioners and clinicians the
appropriate approach
to discussing unapproved drugs and does
not create a chilling
effect amongst the
general scientific com-

munity. The FDA has
to balance enforcing
the Act and the FDA
regulations with not
impeding on the real
life day-to-day exchange of information
among practitioners,
clinicians, and others in
the general scientific
community. ☼
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law in Brussels, Belgium; and has been a visiting scholar at Universite Paris Dauphine, Paris, France,
Seton Hall University, and the University of Minnesota. He received his B.A magna cum laude from
Wesleyan University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School.
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Student Contributors
Katherine Freed graduated from Stevens Institute of Technology and is
named as principle inventor on a patent application in the field of medical
imaging. In 2008, she volunteered with the Irish government‟s Health Services Executive, Ireland‟s healthcare system. She has served as a research assistant to Professor Jordan Paradise, studying federal oversight of nanotechnology. Katherine worked at Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto last summer
and will join Robinson & Cole this summer.

Nicole Hamberger graduated from Gettysburg College in 2008 with an
English major and a Writing minor. In summer 2009, she completed a legal
externship at St. Michael‟s Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey. In college,
she assisted in medical malpractice and personal injury cases as an intern for
two summers at Gold Albanese & Barletti in Morristown, NJ, and for one
summer at Wolf Block Brach Eichler in Roseland, New Jersey.

Rachel Jones is an L.L.M. student in the Law School‟s Health Law program.
She graduated from Northwestern University, School of Law in 2001 and has
since practiced corporate law in New York City. As a corporate attorney she
was engaged in several healthcare transactions, which peaked her interest in
the field. Rachel is experienced in representing healthcare providers in their
corporate transactions, including securities offerings, mergers and acquisitions
and SEC filings.

Constantina Koulosousas is a third-year student in the Health Law Concentration at Seton Hall Law School. She is currently participating in the Civil
Litigation Clinic and plans to pursue a career in Health Law upon graduation.

PAGE 33

VOLUME III, ISSUE 2

Student Contributors
Stephanie Mazzaro graduated in May 2007 with a BSN from the University
of Pennsylvania. Since then she has practiced as a registered nurse in a major
New York City hospital where she specialized in the Pediatric and Neonatal
Intensive Care Units, as well as the general pediatrics unit. This past summer,
she worked as a nurse at a day camp for children with cancer. Stephanie continues to work part time as a nurse while attending law school to maintain her
skills and knowledge, and more importantly because she finds inspiration and
support from her patients and their families on a regular basis. She plans to
pursue a concentration in Health Law.
Matt McKennan is a second-year student at Seton Hall Law School, and
Vice-President of the Health Law Forum. He graduated from Texas Tech
University with a B.S. in Biology and an M.B.A. specializing in health organization management. During his time at Seton Hall Law, he has served as a
graduate assistant for the Pre-Legal Studies Summer Program, an intern for
the N.J. Superior Court‟s Chancery Division, and is currently a law clerk in
the health care and hospital law practice group at Sills, Cummis & Gross, P.C.

Dawn Pepin is currently third-year student at Seton Hall University, School
of Law. She is a graduate of George Washington University‟s Bachelor of
Science in Public Health program. Before beginning law school, she spent
eight months living in The Gambia working for Tostan, a West-African nonprofit organization. Dawn plans to use her background in health and human
rights law to pursue a legal career in international development.

Michael Poreda is a third-year student at Seton Hall Law School, where he is
the Executive Director of the Urban Education Law & Policy Initiative. He
holds a BA in history from Rutgers University and an MA in the Teaching of
Social Studies from Teachers College - Columbia University. He previously
taught history at Watchung Hills Regional High School in Warren, New Jersey.
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Health Law Forum News
New Jersey State Bar Association’s Health and Hospital Section, Business Committee, Meeting
Students attended a Health and Hospitals Section meeting held at Seton Hall, led by members of the Business Committee.
Members discussed recently passed legislation in New Jersey and its impacts in the health care industry. Attorneys in attendance
proposed business strategies to deal with the changes in the health care landscape as a result of the new laws.
Committee members then opened the floor to questions by colleagues and students. Members sought advice from one another about the potential effects of the legislation on cases in which they are currently involved. Students appreciated seeing this
collaboration among practicing health lawyers. Several Committee members also stayed after to meet with students, providing an
excellent networking opportunity for those in attendance.
The Health Law Forum thanks the Health and Hospital Section for the opportunity to attend such an informative meeting
and looks forward to the law school hosting more of the Section‟s meetings in the future.

Hospitals in Crisis: Debt Restructuring Options and Issues for Financial Survival
Samuel Maizel, Esq., a bankruptcy attorney specializing in the health care industry, discussed the options available for financially distressed hospitals, as well as the roles of attorneys in ensuring their financial viability. Mr. Maizel offered an insider's perspective on the bankruptcy proceedings facing a number of hospitals, and he discussed the impact that the new Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act may have on distressed hospitals.

Blood Drive
The Health Law Forum directed its second blood drive of the year, in conjunction with the American Red Cross. The spring
semester blood drive was a huge success, thanks to volunteers from the Public Interest Network and the Health Law Forum. The
drive, organized by HLF Vice-President Matt McKennan, was held in the law school‟s Multipurpose Room. The over fifty donations made by faculty and students will help save over 150 lives. Please join us when the Red Cross returns again next year for the
fall semester blood drive.

“Three Grumpy Guys and a Gal”: Health Reform Roundtable Discussion, Upcoming Event
On April 9th, Visiting Professor Thomas Greaney, guest speaker Professor Sidney Watson (both from Saint Louis University,
School of Law) will join Seton Hall‟s Professor Frank Pasquale and Professor John Jacobi for a thorough discussion of the recently
-passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The Health Law Forum looks forward to this exciting event! ☼

www.HealthLawForum.com

Visit our website for past issues of the Health Law
Outlook, the latest on Health Law Forum meetings, information on school-wide health law events, and everything
else health law!
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Health Law Forum News
About the Health Law Forum
The Health Law Forum is a student organization at
Seton Hall Law School for those interested in health
law.
The Health Law Forum hosts speakers, panel discussions, community service projects, and networking
events throughout each academic year.
The Health Law Outlook (HLO), a subsidiary of the
Health Law Forum for students interested in health policy, hosts regular round-table discussions about current
topics in the healthcare field. Each semester, HLO presents healthcare issues using debate, brain-storming,
presentation, and Socratic method formats. Many of the
articles included in newsletters are the product of these
meetings and discussion.
This semester‟s HLO and HLF meetings and events
included:
Attending a Business Committee meeting of the
New Jersey State Bar Association‟s Health and
Hospital Section.

Seton Hall University School of Law
Health Law Forum
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HLF 2009-2010 Executive Board:
Matthew Colford (3L), President
Matthew McKennan (2L), Vice President
Kaitlin Semler (3L), Treasurer
Nicole Ho (2L), Secretary
Sarah Geers (3L), Executive Editor, HLO
Maansi Raswant (2L), Managing Editor,
HLO

A discussion on physician compensation methods in
clinical trials and treatment.

Timothy Norton (3L), Senior Editor, HLO

Spring blood drive, co-sponsored by the Public
Interest Network.

Stephanie Mazzaro (1L), SBA Rep

A meeting discussing about the impact of social networking on health care and the doctor-patient relationship.

Faculty Advisor:

Renee Levine (1L), SBA Rep

Jordan Cohen (2L), Dir. of Online Devel.

Professor Carl Coleman

Contact us at SHU.Outlook@gmail.com
Visit our website at www.HealthLawForum.com
The opinions expressed herein are solely opinions of the authors and not of Seton Hall University School of Law or the Health Law Forum. This newsletter and articles
herein are licensed under a Creative Commons non-commercial use/attribution/share-alike license. For further information, consult the Creative Commons website.
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